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The New North Carolina Rules of Evidence:
Privileges, Relevancy, Competency, Impeachment,
and Expert Opinion
On July 7, 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly adopted the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence and Official Commentary. The Code became ef-
fective July 1, 1984.1 The major impetus for the adoption of an evidence code
was the concern that North Carolina evidence law had become unwieldy.2
Having developed over the years through a number of narrow statutes and
conflicting judicial decisions, North Carolina evidence law was confusing and
difficult to master.3 The advantages of the Code will be its clarity and
accessibility.4
Despite codification, the law of evidence in North Carolina will not be
changed substantiay.5 Such changes would have defeated the utility of the
Code by forcing trial judges and lawyers to relearn the law of evidence. Al-
though there are important differences between the Code and previous North
Carolina law, the transition should be manageable.
The drafters based the Code on the Federal Rules of Evidence 6 for two
reasons. First, the federal rules are familiar to practitioners in North Caro-
lina.7 They consist of generally accepted rules that have been followed in
North Carolina and other states,8 and are typically the basis of instruction in
1. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION EVIDENCE LAWS
STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT TO 1983 GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Jan. 12, 1982) at v. [hereinafter cited
as Committee Report]. The lapse between the adoption and effective dates was necessary to allow
practitioners to become familiar with the rules. Id. at v-vi. The effectiveness of evidence rules
depends on their familiarity, because attorneys and judges must make decisions in court within
seconds. Blakey, Moving Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles: Several Suggestions
Concerning an Evidence Codefor North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 5 (1981).
2. Committee Report, supra note 1, at iii.
3. Patrick, Toward a Codfication ofthe Law oEvidence in North Carolina, 16 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 669 (1980).
4. Id. at 670.
5. 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 2, at 2 n.6 (1982 & Supp.
1983).
6. Committee Report, supra note 1, at iv.
7. Blakey, supra note I, at 4, 9.
8. Id. at 4. There have been cases in which the federal rule differed from the North Caro-
lina rule, but the trial court applied the federal rule. For example, under FED. R. EVID. 405, on
cross-examination of a character witness, inquiry is allowed into specific acts of the person whose
character is in issue. Prior to the enactment of the new North Carolina Rules of Evidence, how-
ever, the North Carolina rule had been that such cross-examination into specific acts was not
allowed. In State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978), a homicide case, the trial
court had allowed the prosecuting attorney to cross-examine defendant's mother, a character wit-
ness, as to defendant's participation in two gang shootings. The North Carolina Supreme Court
held that the trial court had erred by permitting such inquiry into prior acts of misconduct, but
that the error had not prejudiced defendant. Id. at 573-74, 247 S.E.2d at 912-13.
In State v. Chapman, 294 N.C. 407, 241 S.E.2d 667 (1978), a prosecution for felonious assault,
the court held that it was error to allow the prosecutor to ask defendant's character witness about
an occasion when defendant "got his gun and went after some black people in Charlotte." Id. at
law school evidence classes. 9 Second, the Federal Rules of Evidence were
used as a model because they have proved both thorough and manageable. 10
The first major change under the new code is rule 301, Presumptions in
Generalin CivilActions and Proceedings.1" Under prior North Carolina law, a
presumption shifted the burden of persuasion in some cases, 12 and the burden
of going forward with evidence in others. 13 Under new rule 301, unless a
court decides otherwise, a presumption shifts the burden of going forward with
evidence rather than shifting the burden of persuasion. 14 The new North Car-
olina rule differs from the majority rule, which shifts the burden of persua-
sion.' 5 Shifting only the burden of production of evidence has been criticized
because it "gives too little weight to the concerns that cause the initial creation
of presumptions."'16 Those who support shifting only the burden of produc-
tion, however, assert that presumptions are artificial rules to cope with difficult
problems of proof, and that they should not compel one conclusion if evidence
to the contrary exists.' 7
Rule 301 differs from the corresponding federal rule by recognizing judi-
cially created presumptions.' 8 The Official Commentary to the North Caro-
416, 241 S.E.2d at 673. The error, however, was not prejudicial because defendant admitted his
guilt at the trial. Id.
In State v. Hunt, 287 N.C. 360, 215 S.E.2d 40 (1975), a prosecution for rape, felonious assault,
and armed robbery, it was held prejudicial error to permit the prosecuting attorney to ask defend-
ant's character witness about defendant's prior convictions for crimes, including assault.
9. Blakey, supra note 1, at 9.
10. Committee Report, supra note 1, at v. (citing Mueller, Symposium on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 585 (1977)).
11. For a discussion of presumptions in general and a specific proposal for a different pre-
sumption rule in North Carolina, see Broun, The Unfulfillable Promise of One Rulefor All Pre-
sumptions, 62 N.C.L. REv. 697 (1984).
12. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 218 at 276-80. See, e.g., id. § 246, at 256 (presumption that
child born in wedlock is legitimate is "one of the strongest known to law" and "can be rebutted
only by proof that the husband could not have been the father"). If a presumption shifts the
burden of persuasion, rule 301 does not apply. N.C. R. EVID. 301 comment. The "burden of
persuasion" means that if the party having the burden fails to persuade the trier of fact, the issue
must be found against that party. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336
(E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
13. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 218. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Republic Bank & Trust Co., 35
N.C. App. 101,239 S.E.2d 867 (1978). A bank has the burden of going forward with evidence that
there was no active loss when a customer shows that the bank paid a check despite a stop order.
Id. at 104, 239 S.E.2d at 869. The "burden of going forward with evidence" means that the party
having the burden must produce evidence "such that a reasonable man could draw from it the
inference of the existence of the particular fact to be proved" or the trier of fact must find against
him. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 338, at 789.
14. N.C. R. EVID. 301. McCormick defines "presumption" as "a standardized practice,
under which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof
of other facts." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 342, at 803. Rule 301 states clearly that once the
presumption is rebutted the issue goes to the jury and the jury may, but does not have to, infer the
existence of the presumed fact.
15. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE at T-16 to -19 (1979); Patrick, supra note 3, at
681.
16. Patrick, supra note 3, at 681.
17. IX J. WIGMOtE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2491 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
18. The new North Carolina rule governs presumptions "not otherwise provided for by stat-
ute, by judicial decision, or by [the North Carolina Rules of Evidence]," N.C. R. EVID. 301, the
federal rule covers presumptions "not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by [the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence]." FED. R. EVID. 301.
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lina Rules of Evidence states that "the General Assembly and the courts retain
power to create presumptions having an effect different from that provided for
in this rule"; 19 however, "a presumption created by a prior statute or judicial
decision should be construed to come within the scope of this rule unless it is
clear that the presumption was not intended to be a 'mandatory presump-
tion'[-a presumption that a court must follow a finding of a preliminary fact
unless there is sufficient evidence that the presumed fact does not exist]."'20
The commentary has been criticized for favoring uniformity at the expense of
the policies underlying previous judicial decisions.21 This rule probably will
have little impact, however, because courts have the discretion to adopt those
rules existing before rule 301.22
Article Four deals with relevancy. 23 Rule 404, Character Evidence not Ad-
missible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes,24 is virtually the same as
Federal Rule of Evidence 404.25 The general rule that character evidence is
not admissible as circumstantial evidence of conduct 26 is consistent with prior
North Carolina practice.2 7 There also remains an exception allowing the ac-
cused to offer evidence of his character and allowing the prosecution to rebut
this evidence;28 however, the type of evidence permitted under this exception
has been changed by rule 404(a)(1). 29 Previously, North Carolina would al-
low evidence of the accused's general character to be admitted in evidence
under this exception, 30 but rule 404(a)(1) limits the character evidence to "per-
tinent trait[s] of his character,"' 3' or those character traits relevant to the con-
duct being investigated. The old North Carolina rule had originated in the
ambiguous language of an earlier opinion, which subsequently was misinter-
preted.32 The old rule was construed to allow the witness to testify about rep-
19. N.C. R. EVID. 301 comment.
20. Id. Another limitation on the scope ofthe rule is that, "[i]fby statute or judicial decision
a particular presumption shifts the burden of [persuasion], Rule 301 does not apply." Id.
21. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 215, at 173-74, nn.93-95 (Supp. 1983).
22. There is some benefit in uniformity. A uniform rule is easier to learn and apply. See
supra note I. Furthermore, the strongest policies that underly presumptions probably will be
those shifting the burden of persuasion; for those presumptions, rule 301 will not apply. See supra
note 20.
23. Relevancy, when used to describe evidence, means "render[ing] the desired inference
more probable than it would be without the evidence." C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 12, § 185, at
437.
24. N.C. R. EVID. Rule 404.
25. The North Carolina rule adds the word "entrapment" to the nonexclusion list of "crimes,
wrongs, or acts" that may be admitted for a purpose other than to prove the conduct of a person.
Id. 404(b).
26. Id. 404(a).
27. Id. 404 comment.
28. Patrick, supra note 3, at 684.
29. N.C. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
30. Id. 404 comment.
31. Id. 404(a)(1).
32. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 114 (1982). In State v. Perkins, 66 N.C. 126 (1872), the
court spoke in terms of "general character" but clearly meant "reputation" when it held that "a
witness who swears to the general bad character of another witness on the other side, may, upon
cross-examination, be asked to name the individual whom he heard speak disparagingly of the
witness and what was said." Id. at 127. In a later decision, State v. Hairston, 121 N.C. 429, 28 S.E.
1292 Vol. 62
utation for specific traits of character, whether relevant to an issue in the
case.33 The new rule eliminates the danger that the prosecution will use the
exception to introduce irrelevant evidence prejudicial to the defendant. 34
Rule 405, Methods of Proving Character, which is very similar to federal
rule 405, changes North Carolina law by allowing opinion evidence to prove
character. 35 Previously, questions concerning character had to be stated in
terms of "reputation." 3 6 Questions phrased with the terms "general character"
or "reputation and character" also were permissible because it was understood
that the question dealt with reputation.37 The practical result of such leniency
in the framing of questions, however, was the admission of opinion evidence,
despite the prohibition against it.38 Witnesses did not understand the distinc-
tion between reputation and personal opinion of character.39 The old rule was
also criticized for admitting "the second-hand, irresponsible product of multi-
492 (1897), the court used the term "general character" but did not mean "reputation." The. court
held that, "[a] party introducing a witness as to character can only prove the general character of
the person asked about. The witness, of his own motion, may say in what respect it is good or
bad.' Id. at 431, 28 S.E. at 494. Although the Hairston court did not cite Perkins, the contrast
between uses of the term "general character" in these cases demonstrates that the exception
evolved from allowing only evidence of reputation to allowing evidence of character.
33. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 114 (1982). In State v. Reagan, 185 N.C. 710, 117 S.E. 1
(1923), the witness was allowed to testify that defendant had a bad reputation for making liquor,
although he was accused of larceny. Similarly, in State v. Fleming, 194 N.C. 42, 138 S.E. 342
(1927), an unlawful entry case, the witness was allowed to testify that defendant had a bad reputa-
tion for making liquor.
34. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 114, at 423 n.91 (1982).
[The old rule] open[ed] the door to evidence of character traits which [were] irrelevant
and prejudicial, and permit[ted] the prosecution, under the guise of impeaching the de-
fendant as a witness, to prove traits having no relation to veracity but which [were] rele-
vant on the issue of guilt, thus evading the rule (see § 104) prohibiting the State from
attacking the defendant's character unless he first puts it in issue.
35. N.C. R. EVID. 405. The North Carolina rule is identical to FaD. R. EviD. 405, except for
North Carolina's explicit limitation on expert testimony: "Expert testimony on character or a trait
of character is not admissible as circumstantial evidence of behavior." N.C. R. EvID. 405(a).
Allowing opinion evidence to prove character opened the door for a new type of character evi-
dence: expert testimony to prove character. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 149 (1977 & Supp. 1978). The Official Commentary to the North Carolina rules explains that
the rule's limitation "is not intended to exclude expert testimony of a personality or character
change as it relates to the issue of damages," but only "to prohibit expert testimony as it relates to
the likelihood of whether or not the defendant committed the act he is accused of." N.C. R. EvID.
405 comment. This limitation is based on the drafters' fear that in most cases such expert testi-
mony would not be helpful and would waste time. Id.
36. N.C. R. EVID. 405 comment.
37. Id. (citing State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 30 S.E.2d 230 (1944)). In King the court stated
that "the test ordinarily applied here [is] that of general character, which with us means reputa-
tion." King, 224 N.C. at 331, 330 S.E.2d at 231. See also State v. Hicks, 200 N.C. 539, 540, 157
S.E. 851, 852 (1933) ("The rule is that when an impeaching or sustaining character witness is
called, he should first be asked whether he knows the general reputation and character of the
witness or party about which he proposes to testify."); State v. Cathey, 170 N.C. 794, 796, 87 S.E.
532, 533 (1916) ("[A] character witness may be asked on cross-examination if there was not a
general reputation as to particular matters.").
38. Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Relevancy, Competence, Privi-
leges, Witnesses, Opinion, and Expert Witnesses, 14 TULSA L. REV. 227, 265 (1978) (quoting 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EvIDENCE § 405[02], at 405-20 (1978). "The average witness is unable
to understand the admonition not to give his opinion, but that of others. He came to give his
opinion and, despite some wrangling among attorneys and judges, that is what he usually manages
to do.").
39. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 110, at 403 n.13 (1982). In State v. Barbour, 295 N.C.
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plied guesses and gossip which we term reputation,"40 but excluding evidence
based "on first hand knowledge and belief."4 1 Underlying the old rule was the
questionable assumption that a witness' bias could affect his opinion of the
character of a person, but not his view of that person's reputation.42 Rule 405
is an improvement over the old rule because, rather than allowing opinion
evidence in disguise, it admits clearly labelled opinion evidence that the trier
of fact can evaluate as such.
A further change in the rules of character testimony is that, contrary to
prior North Carolina law43 but consistent with the federal rule,"4 new North
Carolina rule 405(a) permits inquiry on cross-examination into relevant spe-
cific acts of the person whose character is in question.45 The rationale under-
lying this rule is that evidence of specific examples of conduct is necessary to
evaluate the witness' testimony, which is based only on what he has heard.46
The rule has been criticized because "[t]he probative value of such evidence to
impeach a character witness seldom outweighs the prejudice suffered by the
opponent. '47 Because the rule differs from prior case law,48 however, North
Carolina courts are likely to interpret it strictly to prevent abuse.
Article Six deals with witnesses.49 Rule 601, GeneralRule of Competency,-
Disqualfcation of Witness,50 revises the Dead Man's Statute that, in certain
situations, disqualified persons interested in a transaction when the other party
to the transaction subsequently had died or become insane.5' Rule 601 nar-
66, 243 S.E.2d 380 (1978), the witness answered a question calling for "character" with her own
opinion of the person's character when his reputation was in issue.
40. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 1986.
41. Patrick, supra note 3, at 685.
42. Id.
43. N.C. R. EvID. 405 comment.
44. FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
45. N.C. R. EVID. 405(a).
46. FED. R. EVID. 405 comment.
47. Patrick, supra note 3, at 686.
48. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 115, at 425-26 (1982) & 122 (Supp. 1983). See also id.
§ 115, at 123 n.3.6 (Supp. 1983) ("Of course, it is inconceivable that the Rules intend that ques-
tions about specific conduct may be phrased in any way a master of insinuation may concoct.").
Further support for the federal rule is that it can be remembered more easily. Blakey, aTpra
note 1, at 8. A rule cannot be effective unless it is sufficiently familiar to be followed. See supra
note 1. A number of North Carolina trial judges and lawyers had demonstrated that they believed
the federal rule already was the law in North Carolina. Blakey, supra note 1, at 7. See also supra
note 8.
49. One notable but relatively minor change in North Carolina law occurs under article 6.
Rule 607, Who May Impeach, identical to FED. R. EVID. 607, allows the credibility of a witness to
be attacked by "any party, including the party calling him." N.C. R. EVID. 607. The common-
law rule was that a party could not impeach his own witness. Id. 607 comment. The new rule
should have little impact, because previous decisions and statutes almost had eliminated the com-
mon-law rule in North Carolina. Patrick, supra note 3, at 691-92. The Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Evidence explained that the common-law rule that a party vouches for the
witnesses he calls was unrealistic: "A party does not hold out his witnesses as worthy of belief,
since he rarely has a free choice in selecting them." FED. R. EVID. 607 comment (quoted in N.C.
R. EviD. 607 comment).
50. N.C. R. EVID 601.
51. Upon the trial of an action, or the hearing upon the merits of a special proceeding, a
party or a person interested in the event, or a person from, through or under whom such
a party or interested person derives his interest or title by assignment or otherwise, shall
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rows the scope of excluded evidence under the Dead Man's Statute from "per-
sonal transactions or communications"5 2 to "oral communications" 53 between
the interested party and the deceased or insane person. The original Dead
Man's Statute had been intended to prevent fraud against those unable to tes-
tify in their own behalf.54 The concern that fraud might result was based on
the assumption that a deceased or insane person would be unable to protect
his own interests against a living adversary. This rationale is faulty, however,
because the representatives of a decedent or a lunatic generally will have a
sufficiently strong stake in the outcome to defend the incompetent's interests.55
The Legislative Research Commission as well as several commentators had
recommended the elimination of the Dead Man's Statute,56 which "has fos-
tered more injustice than it has prevented and has led to an unholy waste of
the time and ingenuity of judges and counsel."'57 Dissatisfaction with the
Dead Man's Statute has led to suggestions of better ways to protect the dead
and the insane against fraud; one suggestion was the "creat[ion of] a hearsay
exception for statements about the matter in dispute by the deceased or insane
person."58 The Dead Man's Statute was preserved in its newly restricted form,
not be examined as a witness in his own behalf or interest, or in behalf of the party
succeeding to his title or interest, against the executor, administrator or survivor of a
deceased person, or the committee of a lunatic, or a peron deriving is title or interest
from, through or under a deceased person or lunatic, by assignment or otherwise, con-
cerning a personal transaction or communication between the witness and the deceased
person or lunatic; except where the executor, administrator, survivor, committee or per-
son so deriving title or interest is examined in his own behalf, or the testimony of the
lunatic or deceased person is given in evidence concerning the same transaction or com-
munication. Nothing in this section shall preclude testimony as to the identity of the
operator of a motor vehicle in any case.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. 601(c)(1). The rule does not change any cases that have held the Dead Man's Statute
inapplicable. Id. 601 comment.
54. McCanless v. Reynolds, 74 N.C. 301, 314 (1876) (neither parties nor assigness to deed
executed by dead man competent as witness in dispute over rights under deed).
55. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 66, at 258-59 n.621 (1982):
[I]t seems that much of the argument in defense of the statute is based on a tendency to
identify the deceased with his living representatives, and a resultant feeling that in some
manner the controversy is between the dead man whose mouth is closed and his living
adversary whose mouth ought also to be closed as a matter of fair play and sportsman-
ship. If the contest is viewed realistically as one between living individuals who in most
cases are pure donees of the deceased on the one hand, and other living individuals who,
if their stories are true, have parted with value and are asking only the promised
equivalent, one's sympathies are likely to veer in the other direction. Viewed in this
light, it is hard to see any better reason for silencing witnesses in the cases covered by this
statute than in any other case where a party's evidence has been lost by the death, disap-
pearance or forgetfulness of essential witnesses.
56. See Blakey, supra note 1, at 17-18; Patrick, supra note 3, at 691; see also Survey of Devel-
opments in North Carolina Law, 1982-Evidence, 61 N.C.L. REV. 1126, 1141-43 (1983).
57. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 66, at 259 n.62 (1982).
58. Blakey, supra note 1, at 18 (citing Proposalsfor Legislation in North Carolina, 11 N.C.L.
Rv. 51, 63 (1932)). The proposed legislation was as follows:
No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action, suit or proceeding by reason of
his interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise.
In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of deceased per-
sons, or the committee of a lunatic, including proceedings for the probate of wills, no
statement of the deceased, or lunatic, whether oral or written, shall be excluded as hear-
1984] EVIDEiNCE 1295
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
however, because "of a concern that fraud and hardship could result if an
interested party could testify concerning an oral communication with the de-
ceased or lunatic." 59 The Dead Man's Statute should have been abolished
entirely, because the dangers it addresses are exaggerated and because the stat-
ute may make proof of honest claims impossible. Although the risk of perjury
remains, the function of the judge and jury is to evaluate the credibility of the
witness' testimony. The new North Carolina rule restricting the scope of the
Dead Man's Statute is a step in the right direction.
Rule 608, Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness,60 is very similar
to Federal Rule of Evidence 608. The only difference is that North Carolina
rule 608(a),6 1 to prevent expert testimony on the credibility of a witness, 62
includes a reference to rule 405(a).63 Rule 608(a) allows a witness' credibility
to be attacked by reputation or opinion of character for untruthfulness, and
supported-only after attack-by reputation or opinion of character for truth-
fulness.64 Before this rule was enacted, opinion evidence was not admissible
to prove a witness' character in North Carolina. Opinion evidence, however,
was inadvertently admitted because questions could be phrased in terms of
"general character" or "reputation and character."65 The new rule will make
clear to the trier of fact whether testimony is based on opinion. Furthermore,
under the old North Carolina rule, evidence of specific traits of character was
admissible whether or not relevant to the credibility of the witness. 66 Rule
608(a)(1) wisely limits evidence to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
Rule 608(b) states the general rule, already adopted in North Carolina,67
that evidence of specific instances of conduct is not admissible to support or
attack a witness' credibility.68 One exception created by this subsection, how-
ever, extends North Carolina law. On cross-examination, specific acts of a
witness relevant to his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness 69 are ad-
say provided that the trial judge shall find as a fact that the statement was made, and that
it was made in good faithe and on the declarant's personal knowledge.
Proposalsfor Legislation in North Carolina, 11 N.C.L. REv. 51, 63 (1932).
59. N.C. R. Evm. 601 comment.
60. Id. 608.
61. Id. 608(a).
62. Id. 608 comment. The concern that led to the express prohibition of expert testimony on
the credibility of a witness was that such testimony usually would not be helpful and would waste
time. See supra note 35.
63. N.C. R. EVID. 405(a).
64. Id. 608(a).
65. Witnesses did not understand the distinction between reputation and personal opinions
of character. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
66. The rule in North Carolina had been that evidence of a specific trait of character was
admissible only if asked on cross-examination, or if "volunteered" by the witness on direct exami-
nation in answer to a question whether the witness knew the subject's general reputation or repu-
tation and character. N.C. R. EVID. 608 comment.
67. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 111 (1982).
68. N.C. R. EvID. 608(b).
69. The practice in North Carolina had been to allow inquiry into any "prior bad acts" of the
principal witness. See State v. Purcell, 296 N.C. 728, 733, 252 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1979). Under the
language of rule 608(b), this practice should be limited to questions concerning acts relevant to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. N.C. R. EVID. 608(b). The danger exists, however,
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missible at the discretion of the trial judge.70 Previous North Carolina law
had restricted this type of evidence to acts of the principal witness;7 1 the new
rule allows evidence of acts bearing on the credibility of any witness testifying
about the credibility of the principal witness. The Advisory Committee recog-
nized the possiblity of abuse of this rule and created safeguards to prevent
such abuse.72 Subdivision (b) makes clear that a witness does not waive his
privilege against self-incrimination merely by testifying about matters of cred-
ibility.7 3 This rule rejects earlier North Carolina decisions that allowed cross-
examination concerning past criminal acts reflecting on a witness'
credibility. 74
Rule 609, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime, deals with
impeachment by evidence of criminal convictions.75 Generally, under 609(a),
evidence of a crime punishable by more than sixty day's confinement is admis-
sible. Previously, North Carolina would allow inquiry into any criminal of-
fense to attack the credibility of an witness. 76 In contrast, Federal Rule of
Evidence 609 allows impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime in-
volving dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment,77 or evi-
dence of conviction of any crime punishable by a sentence more severe than
one year's imprisonment if the court finds that the probative value of the evi-
dence outweighs its prejudicial effect.78 Subsection (a) of the North Carolina
rule requires no such balancing of the probative value and the potential
prejudice of the evidence. 79 Thus, the new rule could be criticized for admit-
ting evidence that may have no relation to the credibility of the witness. Rule
403, however, provides that any evidence may be excluded if the danger of
prejudice outweighs its probative value. The new North Carolina rule has the
advantage of being clear and simple to apply;80 the federal rule has created
ambiguity by its use of the term "dishonesty." 8'
that in interpreting rule 608(b), North Carolina courts will read "acts concerning character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness" so broadly as to continue much of the currect practice. This inter-
pretation would be unfortunate and contrary to the spirit with which the rules were enacted.
70. N.C. R. EVID. 608(b).
71. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 111 (1982).
72. N.C. R. EVID. 608 comment. The safeguards mentioned are: that the instances of con-
duct must be probative of truthfulness; that the danger of prejudice or confusion must not out-
weigh the probative value; and that there must not be harassment or undue embarassment. With
these safeguards, the rule can be useful because the credibility of every witness is important to
consider.
73. N.C. R. EvID. 608(b).
74. Id. 608 comment. It is likely that this provision of the rule is constitutionally mandated.
The accused's right to testify would be restricted severely if exercising this right would allow
inquiry into all past criminal acts, in disregard of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
(citing FED. R. EVID. 608 comment).
75. Id. 609.
76. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 112 (1982).
77. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
78. Id. 609(a)(1).
79. N.C. R. EvID. 609(a).
80. See supra note 1.
81. FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(2). The Conference Report to the federal rule explains that crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement include: "crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury,
false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature
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Article Seven provides for opinion and expert testimony. Rule 703, Bases
of Opinion Testimony by Experts,8 2 identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 703,
is consistent with the North Carolina Supreme Court decision in State v.
Wade,83 which allowed an expert to rely on data he observed outside of court.
Rule 703 allows expert reliance on outside data that would not be admissible
in evidence, if the data is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."'84 Al-
though the Wade court used the term "inherently reliable"85 rather than "rea-
sonably relied upon by experts," 86 the Official Commentary says that the new
rule does not change the holding in Wade. 7 Prior to Wade, North Carolina
Supreme Court decisions concerning whether an expert witness could base his
decision on such data were in conflict.88 Rule 703 appears to adopt any clarifi-
cation of North Carolina law contributed by the Wade opinion; however, use
of the ambiguous phrase "reasonably relied upon by experts"8 9 does not re-
solve the question of what can be the basis for the expert's opinion.90
Rule 704, Opinion on Ultimate Issue, allows an expert to give his opinion
about the "ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." 9 1 This rule is
identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 704. The common-law rule precluded a
of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsi-
fication bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully." H. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, 7103. The extent to
which "dishonesty" extends the scope of convictions admitted into evidence has been a source of
conflict under the federal rule. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 43, at 12 n.60.4 (Supp, 1978)
(citing United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (conviction for attempted robbery
excluded for not involving "dishonesty"); United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 197)
(conviction for petty larceny admitted as involving "dishonesty")).
82. N.C. R. EVID. 703.
83. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979). The court in Wade held that a "physician, as an
expert witness, may give his opinion, including a diagnosis, based either on personal knowledge or
observation or on information supplied him by others, including the patient, if such information is
inherently reliable even though it is not independently admissible into evidence." Id. at 462, 251
S.E.2d at 412.
84. N.C. R. EVID. 703.
85. Wade, 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
86. N.C. R. EVID. 703.
87. Id. comment.
88. See Blakey, Examination of Expert Witnesses in North Carolina, 61 N.C.L. REV. 1, 21
(1982); Note, State v. Wado--Expert Testimony and the DualReliabili y Test, 58 N.C.L. REv. 1161
(1980). Some pre-Wade cases admitted doctors' opinions derived from patients' out of court state-
ments. See, e.g., Penland v. Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957) (doctor's testimony
that plaintiff had been disabled was based on statements made outside of court by plaintiff that
would have been inadmissible as hearsay); State v. Alexander, 179 N.C. 759, 103 S.E. 383 (1920)
(psychiatrist's testimony that defendant was insane was based on conversations with defendant
outside of court, which conversations would have been inadmissible as hearsay).
Another case excluded doctors' opinions based on statements made outside of court. Todd v.
Watts, 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967) (doctors' opinions about plaintiff's injuries, based in
part on conversations with plaintiff, excluded because not based on personal knowledge of acci-
dent and consequential injuries).
89. N.C. R. EvID. 703.
90. Blakey, supra note 88, at 26-32. Professor Blakey explores some of the questions remain-
ing after the Wade decision on the subject of the proper bases for physicians' opinions. Id. at 29-
32. One question, with respect to doctors, is whether information from persons who are not pa-
tients would be sufficiently reliable.
91. N.C. R. EvID. Rule 704.
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witness from giving such an opinion.9 2 North Carolina courts had abrogated
the common-law rule to some extent by allowing expert opinion whenever
"the witness because of his expertise is in a better position to have an opinion
on the subject than is the trier of fact." 93 The basis for the common-law rule
was that the witness otherwise would be invading the province of the jury, or
telling the jury how the case should be decided.94 Problems arose in defining
the province of the jury, however, because the jury must resolve a number of
issues with the help of all available evidence before reaching its final decision.
To preclude opinions on every issue to be considered by the jury would elimi-
nate a great deal of relevant opinion evidence.95 Furthermore, the common-
law rule overlooked the more important concern whether the witness' opinion
would help the trier of fact reach a conclusion.96 Safeguards exist in rules
70197 and 70298 to exclude opinion evidence that would not be helpful to the
trier of fact, and rule 403 excludes evidence if there is substantial danger of
confusing the issues or wasting time.99 Thus, an opinion that does no more
than tell the jury how to resolve the ultimate issue would be excluded because
the opinion would not help the jury and would waste time. °°
An important rule that does not change North Carolina law is rule 705,
Disclosure of Facts or Data Underling Expert Opinion,101 which preserves a
recent statutory change. North Carolina General Statutes section 8-58.14, en-
acted in 1981, abolished the requirement of prior disclosure of facts underly-
ing an expert's opinion; thereafter, hypothetical questions to avoid prior
disclosure became unnecessary. 10 2 Rule 705, which replaces section 8-
58.14,103 however, does not permit an opinion based on inadequate data. Rule
705 and its predecessor were enacted in response to the confusion created by
conflicting explanations of the basis for the expert's opinion.'(" Disclosure of
underlying facts, however, will be required if requested by an adverse
party.'0 5 In this respect, rule 705 differs from Federal Rule of Evidence 705
92. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 126 (1982).
93. State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 569, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1975).
94. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 12. The fear was that the jury merely would adopt the
expert's opinion without independent analysis of all the evidence. Id.
95. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 126 (1982) (witness could invade jury's province with fac-
tual, as well as opinion evidence, and jury is free to reject either.)
96. See Patrick, supra note 3, at 696. Professor Stansbury proposed an alternative rule:
"Opinion is inadmissible whenever the witness can relate facts so that . . . the jury is as well
qualified as the witness to draw inferences and conclusions from the facts." 1 D. STANSBuRY, THE
NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 124 (Brandis rev. 3d ed. 1973). Professor Stansbury's
concern is addressed adequately by rules 701 and 702, which limit opinion evidence to that which
would be helpful to the trier of fact.
97. N.C. R. EvID. 701(b).
98. Id. 702.
99. Id. 403.
100. N.C. R. EVID. 704 comment (quoting FED. R. EvID. 704 comment).
101. Id. 705.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.14 (1981).
103. N.C. R. EvID. 705 comment.
104. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 17.
105. N.C. R. EvID. 705.
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which gives the court, not the adverse party, the discretion to require such
prior disclosure.10 6
FRANKLIN MILLER WILLIAMS
106. FED. R. EvID. 705.
